2U  I Must Have Done Something Right

On the morning after the Nui Ba Den Sapper attack, there was a fact-finding inspection by Major General Williamson, commanding general of the 25th Infantry Division. He was personally interviewing officers on the mountain concerning their actions during the attack. When I met General Williamson, I was at once impressed with him. I could tell he was a no-nonsense man who did not tolerate excuses. I told him the strategy I had used while leading the Reaction Force, then he had me show him on a map the route I had taken during the attack. Next, he had me walk that same route with him while I described my actions. During our walk, he complimented me on the security additions I had made to the inner and outer perimeters, and he seemed quite satisfied with my answers to his questions. On the walk back to his helicopter, he asked me if I had any plans to make a career out of the Army. I told him that the only way I would stay in the Army was if I was allowed to join Special Forces, as I thought it was the most professional of all the branches. He stared into my eyes for what seemed like minutes and then told me to pack my bags. (“Pack my bags? Huh? What did that mean? Was I relieved from duty?” All these thoughts were racing through my mind). He did not say much about his inspection, other than to tell me the Viet Cong would have overrun the signal site if I had not led the Reaction Force. As he was boarding his helicopter one of his aides pulled me aside and told me I had two weeks to make up my mind about Special Forces. If I accepted, I would go to jump school when I made captain, then go directly into Special Forces without going through a qualification course. As far as the general was concerned, what I had done last night was my qualification course, and I had aced it.
What I did not know until after General Williamson had left was that I was the only officer on the mountain who was not relieved from duty. As General Williamson was leaving on one helipad, another helicopter on the back pad was landing with replacements for Major Campbell and the three infantry lieutenants. I learned later that the general was fuming when he found out where the infantry lieutenants were during the attack. It seems that while I was leading the Reaction Force, the other officers had stayed in their individual bunkers and would not leave to help me clear the Viet Cong from inside the perimeter. They all gave the same excuse: that it would have been suicidal to leave the safety of their bunkers. Major Campbell wound up taking the brunt of the blame because he could not get the lieutenants to move.
Note: I personally knew all the officers that were relieved that night, and they were all good officers. If the three of them felt it was too dangerous to leave their bunkers due to enemy fire, I believe them. 

The Nui Ba Den attack was uniquely different than an attack taking place on flat terrain. The noise level was unbelievably high, and it was difficult to tell the direction from whence the enemy fire was coming. Even after my men and I fortified the area around the destroyed bunker, all I could think about was where and when the main enemy attack would occur. It was sunrise before my adrenaline level went back to normal and my body and mind accepted that the attack was truly over, and I was going to live one more day.