SPECIAL FORCES ASSOCIATION
Here is a copy of one of the documents that I had to submit with my Special Forces application to prove eligibility.
My association with the 5th Special Forces Group began around January 10, 1969, and ran until October 15, 1969, the entire time spent in Tây Ninh Province. What I learned from collaborating with the men from B-32 and A-324 has had a lasting effect on my life. Their professionalism, bravery, and esprit de corps are virtues that I have applied to my life, and even after forty-seven years, they still influence my personal and business life.
My first three months in Vietnam were spent in Tây Ninh East at the old MACV compound, across from B-32, where I was attached to the 25th Division Forward Tactical Operations Center in a counterinsurgency role. Our eleven-man team consisted of a brigadier general, an infantry major, three Army intelligence captains, two 1st Lt. infantry officers, one 1st Lt. Signal Corps officer, and three radio operators.
Our mission was to gather intelligence for the Tây Ninh area and disseminate it to associated U.S. interests. We made frequent trips to B-32, the CIA compound in Tây Ninh East, and the Phoenix Committee, which was in our compound. I went to B-32 at least twice a week to deliver and pick up documents. To this day, I still do not know the purpose of those visits due to all the secrecy involved. I assumed their presence had to do with the Phoenix Program or our various missions in War Zone C.
Our time in the MACV compound ended suddenly one night when Viet Cong sappers blew up the ammo dump. Over 200 Vietnamese troops died in the explosion, but luckily, our team suffered only minor wounds.
The next six months were spent on Nui Ba Den Mountain. Over fifteen different Army units in III Corps had a signal unit on Nui Ba Den, including the 5th Special Forces Group. This is where I had daily contact with the A-324 mission. Their defense is what I will use to demonstrate my contribution to the Special Forces mission.
On Nui Ba Den, your life hung on the strength of the perimeter defenses, as the Viet Cong controlled 95 percent of the mountain. When the clouds encircled the mountaintop, all air support stopped and eliminated any chance of reinforcement if attacked.
My jobs on the mountain were twofold: executive officer and Reaction Force leader. My orders were to make sure all signal units had uninterrupted radio communications and to command the Reaction Force if attacked. As the executive officer, I also had the responsibility of taking over the infantry company if Major Campbell was killed or put out of action.
I took both jobs seriously, knowing that the enemy had overrun the mountain in 1968 and killed twenty-four Americans and wounded thirty-five. During that attack, the Viet Cong destroyed most of the signal equipment. The resulting consequences to the U.S. mission were such that most of the radio and telephone communications were disrupted in III Corps.
My multiple job titles divided my time between signal officer and infantry officer. Most of my signal time was spent with the never-ending frequency and interference problems. No sooner did I get one unit’s interference problems solved than that solution caused another problem. It just went on and on, but that was part of the job, and I accepted it.
The job of executive officer gave me the opportunity to strengthen our defenses. I was determined that another major attack, if it did happen again, was not going to end the same way. I was always making changes to our defenses, some of which were unorthodox, but I did everything humanly possible to give us an edge over our enemy. I even went as far as to plan hypothetical attacks on our own positions, then study our response times and actions to the various scenarios.
The signal units, including A-324, were three- or four-man detachments whose sole job was to operate their radios. They played no significant role in the defense of the mountain due to their limited manpower and job importance. This was an advantage for our Reaction Force, as it helped to eliminate friendly-fire incidents.
My realization of how fast a sapper team could destroy our signal complex caused me to reevaluate the ongoing defense plan. The old plan took too long to implement, so I condensed it and formed a new Reaction Force. The new plan was composed of signal men located near the command post, rather than infantry scattered around the perimeter.
Our new mountain defense plan was simple: fight in place and let the Reaction Force do the rest.
On June 16, 1969, all the security additions paid off when a Viet Cong sapper team, estimated at platoon size, failed in their attempt to destroy our installation. The coordinated sapper attack tried to breach our perimeter in three places but was repelled by concentrated mortar and machine-gun fire.
The perimeter was breached when the Viet Cong destroyed bunker 7 with two RPG rounds. Two sapper teams then entered the perimeter and went in opposite directions. The smaller team headed south, throwing satchel charges into three hooches before blowing up the Air Force complex. The main sapper team headed toward the pagoda and the main signal sites but was intercepted by the Reaction Force and killed before they placed any explosives.
If we had not stopped the sappers when we did, most of the signal sites would have been destroyed, as they were all located near the pagoda. Overall, I lost four men and had about twelve wounded before we drove the remaining enemy forces out of our perimeter.
The good news was that not a single Army signal unit went offline that night.
Note: What I have tried to describe were my own actions leading up to the attack. I also need to thank the suppressive fire from the seventeen remaining bunkers, our two mortar teams, every available piece of artillery that could fire on the mountain, Spooky, and a lot of unrecognized heroes.
I especially thank Major Campbell for coordinating the air strikes, and 1st Sgt. Meyers for managing the mortar teams. I hope this gives you some insight as to my contribution to the defense of the Special Forces mission on Nui Ba Den.
Lt. Zuzulock’s Security Additions for Nui Ba Den
April 15, 1969 – October 15, 1969
Designed and installed a central alarm system to show which of the eighteen bunkers was under attack.
Procured and placed experimental sensors along the western perimeter to monitor enemy movements. Fire missions were called using 81mm and 4.2-inch mortars when sufficient movement was detected.
Obtained one of the new PVS-2 Starlight scopes, an advanced experimental model, and used it to direct mortar and artillery fire on enemy troop movements around the mountain and on the flatlands away from the mountain.
Initiated an “attack only” use of the eighteen M-60s on the bunker line as another early warning system. Any weapon used on full auto would immediately initiate a full alert.
Trained and commanded a twelve-man Reaction Force composed of men from various signal units.
Set up an inner defense utilizing two M2 machine guns near the pagoda.
Booby-trapped two heavily trafficked Viet Cong trails on the western side of the mountain using M3A1 shaped charges with one roll of single-strand barbed wire to each charge. Monitoring was done with sensors and command-detonated from the bunker line.
Was in the process of finishing perimeter lighting, but the attack came before activation.
Initiated Air Force photo reconnaissance missions over the mountaintop and mapped active enemy trails for our 4.2-inch mortar squad.
Dropped over 100 M-26 grenades into various cave openings we found inside and outside the perimeter. Suspicious caves were sealed using C-4.
Sped up completion of the road running around the inner perimeter to enable rapid resupply of bunkers from the helicopter pad.
Added an additional 300 feet of concertina wire around the western perimeter and doubled tanglefoot between bunkers 5 through 8. Also doubled trip flares and Claymore mines where needed.
Got Army Engineers to increase our fields of fire on the western perimeter by blasting large boulders.
