The lessons of Nui Ba Dinh...
In early 1965, before American combat units were sent to Vietnam, a young Green Beret officer learned a couple of lessons about South Vietnam that could have served as examples for the thousands of American soldiers who would follow. The officer was Captain James (“Bo”) Gritz, who years later would become well known as the leader of the force that attempted to rescue the American hostages in Iran.
Gritz was a district and Special Forces camp adviser assigned to the village Sui Da, not far from Tay Ninh City in southern South Vietnam. A 3,200-foot mountain called Nui Ba Dinh literally and figuratively cast its shadow on the village. Controlled by the Viet Cong, it was the only hill or mountain of any kind in the surrounding flat plains, making it one of the most prominent and bizarre natural formations in all Vietnam. The mountain actually had three distinct highpoints — the center formation with the peak, and a smaller one on each side.
Being the aggressive young soldier that he was, Gritz decided to drive the Communists off the mountain. What he quickly learned was that in South Vietnam, almost any military action could have political and cultural ramifications that outweighed purely strategic concerns. For historical and religious reasons, Nui Ba Dinh was of almost mystical importance for Vietnamese in the area. During the Second World War, soldiers of the Cao Dai religious sect had held it against the Japanese; during the long fight with the French, the Viet Minh had held it; since the partition in 1954, the Viet Cong had held it. Understandably, Vietnamese believed that those who held these heights were vested with some sort of indomitable spirit.
The Buddhist pagoda located halfway up the center peak, and tolerated by the Viet Cong, contributed to the villagers’ feelings of reverence for the mountain. The pagoda was the objective of religious pilgrims, who climbed ninety-nine steps to reach it; monks and nuns resided there. Being ignorant of Vietnamese culture, as virtually all Americans were, Gritz believed that the mountain’s historic and religious significance made it all the more important as a military objective: if he and his South Vietnamese charges could take it, he thought, all the people in the area would be mightily impressed.
One evening, just as darkness came, Gritz had himself and twenty-five Vietnamese deployed by helicopters to the base of Nui Ba Dinh. Not until they reached that assembly point did he tell them his plan. Initially they balked, but eventually he talked them into the assault, with the help of his top Vietnamese assistant, who was himself tentative about the idea. They then began scaling the heights. Their objective was a spot about 1,500 feet above, on a slope shaped like a saddle connecting two of the highpoints. The position offered the best vantage point for observing the approaches to Tay Ninh City and War Zone C, which was why some of the Viet Cong on the mountain were dug in there.
The enemy did not expect an attack. Although the South Vietnamese Army had attempted to scale the heights once, after quickly suffering a hundred casualties they had withdrawn, never to return. So an understanding about the mountain had evolved. Everyone knew who the Viet Cong commander of the mountain was, and over a period of time, Major Mung had worked out a tacit live-and-let-live understanding with not only the villagers, but even with the Americans. Mung allowed Buddhists to visit the pagoda unmolested, and had permitted the U.S. to establish a radio relay station on the highest point of Nui Ba Dinh. It was useless to him as an observation point because the peak was too often shrouded in clouds.
After scaling the heights to their objective, slowly pulling themselves up over the boulder-strewn, moonlike terrain, Gritz’s men attacked and quickly drove the Viet Cong off the observation point, whose defensive positions had been configured to repel an attack from the opposite direction, which had a more obvious and accessible approach.
Gritz and his men held on for ten days without too much difficulty. Then Gritz’s superior ordered Gritz to come back down because keeping the unit resupplied was tying up too many of the relatively few helicopters then available in South Vietnam. “You have proved your point that the mountain is not invincible,” he told Gritz.
Major Mung was not at all pleased by Gritz’s initiative, and was not placated when the American and his soldiers abandoned their position on Nui Ba Dinh. He announced that Gritz had turned the mountain into a war zone and that henceforth Buddhists could not visit the mountain.
Monks demanded that Gritz secure the pagoda, which he found that he could do. But, with so few men available, he could not secure the path up to it. The result was a net loss for the allied cause. Gritz might have impressed the local population that he could take and hold a position on the mountain, but his venture had alienated the Buddhists.
For the remainder of the war, Nui Ba Dinh remained the exclusive province of Mung and his men. It was off-limits for American troops, except for those assigned to the radio relay station on the peak. But it never lost its attraction to ambitious young soldiers: Gritz himself, who served four years in Vietnam, was occasionally called upon by senior American commanders to dissuade junior officers from attacking Nui Ba Dinh.
